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OF SECRETS AND SPIES: STRENGTHENING
THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW ABOUT
THEClA
Martin E. Halstuk, Ph.D.* and Eric B. Easton, J.D.**
INTRODUCTION

Congress passed the Intelli!fence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (Intelligence Reform Act) in the aftermath of government investigations
into the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The two principal investigations,
2
conducted by the 9/11 Commission and a joint panel of the Senate and House
3
intelligence committees, were harshly critical of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA or the Agency), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Pentagon's intelligence services for failing to share and publicize crucial
information concerning terrorist threats. In particular, the reports singled out

• Martin E. Halstuk is Assistant Professor of Communications in the College of
Communications at Pennsylvania State University, where he teaches mass media law. He is
also Senior Fellow at the Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment. Formerly, he
worked as an editor at the Los Angeles Times and a reporter at the San Francisco Chronicle.
•• Eric B. Easton is Associate Professor of Law at the University of Baltimore School of
Law, where he teaches communications law. He is also a senior research associate at UB's
Center for International and Comparative Law. He was formerly a professional journalist
and is working toward a Ph.D. in Journalism at the University of Maryland.
1. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
118 Stat. 3638-3872.
2. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT]. The
567-page 9/11 Commission report, released July 22, 2004, was prepared by a ten-member,
nonpartisan panel headed by Thomas Kean, former governor of New Jersey.
3. JOINT INQUIRY INTO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE
TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, REPORT OF THE U.S. SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND U.S. HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE, S. REP. No. 107-351 & H.R. REP. No. 107-792, (2002) [hereinafter SENATE
AND HOUSE SELECT COMM. REPORT]. The nearly 900-page Senate and House joint report,
prepared by a panel of the Senate and House intelligence committees, was released July 24,
2003.

353

354

STANFORD LAW AND POLICY REVIEW

[Vol. 17:353

4

the CIA, "the lead agency confronting al-Qaeda," for withholding vital
information that could have averted a series of blunders and missteps in the
critical weeks and months before the assault on New York City and
5
Washington, D.C.
The 9/11 Commission Report revealed that for nearly two years before the
attacks, the CIA had been aware of the al-Qaeda ties of two 9/11 hijackers who
6
were living in San Diego, and the Agency had received reports of terrorist
7
threats within the United States, including information that al-Qaeda had plans
8
to hijack passenger planes and use them as weapons. The Senate and House
joint panel found that the CIA had enough information before the attacks to
warrant defensive measures such as strengthening airport security; placing
suspected terrorists on watch lists; coordinating investigation efforts between
federal and state authorities; and, finally, alerting the American public to the
9
serious nature of the threats. Both investigations concluded that the attacks
might have been thwarted had the CIA disclosed some of its information about
10
the activities of known and suspected al-Qaeda members.
The impetus behind the Intelligence Reform Act was to prevent another
terrorist attack on American soil. The statute completely overhauled the United
States intelligence apparatus, largely by amending the National Security Act of
11
1947, which created the CIA and established the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) as its head. The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that
by renovating the fifty-seven-year-old National Security Act to create a modern
intelligence infrastructure, Congress has also paved the way for a new

4. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 400.
5. /d. at 353, 355-56, 400-03; SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMM. REPORT, supra note
3, at xi, xvii.
6. See 9/l!COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 215-21; SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT
COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at 143-52.
7. See 9/IICOMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 353-58; SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT
COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at 118. See also Dana Priest, White House, CIA Kept Key
Portions of Report Classified, WASH. POST, July 25, 2003, at Al, A16; David Johnston,

Word for Word/Revisiting 9/11; The Warnings Were There, But Who Was Listening? N.Y.
TiMES, July 27, 2003, at AI.
8. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 128-30 & 484 n.ll2 and SENATE
AND HOUSE SELECT COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at 9. See also Walter Pincus & Dan
Eggen, AI Qaeda Unchecked For Years, Panel Says; Tenet Concedes CIA Made Mistakes,
WASH. POST, Apr. 15,2004, at AI, Al2.
9. SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at xv, 118.
10. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 353, 355-56, 400-03; SENATE AND
HOUSE SELECT COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at xvii. The Senate and House joint inquiry
found that "[s]ome significant pieces of information in the vast stream of data being
collected were overlooked, some were not recognized as potentially significant at the time
and therefore not disseminated .... [T]he Intelligence Community failed to fully capitalize
on available, and potentially important, information." SENATE AND HousE SELECT CoMM.
REPORT, supra note 3, at xi.
II. National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343,61 Stat. 495-510 (1947).
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intelligence-information paradigm. That paradigm can reduce what thenSenator Bob Graham, former Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee
and a conferee on the Intelligence Reform Act, characterized as the intelligence
12
community's "dangerous obsession" with secrecy. Certain features of the
13
. on broad d'1ssemmatton
. .
. 11'1gence m
. fiormation,
. 14
o f mte
A ct -an emphas1s
15
enhanced declassification ~rocedures, and a recognition of civil liberties in
1
the fight against terrorism -have drawn into serious question the viability of
17
Central Intelligence Agency v. Sims, the 1985 Supreme Court decision that
exempted the CIA from virtually any disclosure requirements under the
18
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
For the last two decades, near-blanket CIA secrecy has gone largely
19
unchecked, principally because of the Court's ruling in Sims, which granted
the DCI broad and unreviewable authority to protect intelligence sources and
20
methods from unauthorized disclosure. Under the broad powers established in
Sims, the CIA can sidestep strict classification procedures for withholding
21
information and can also withhold unclassified and declassified information
merely on an assertion that "intelligence sources and methods" could be
compromised. Further, the Sims ruling permits the CIA to avoid de novo
judicial review of CIA assertions that "intelligence sources and methods" are
22
actually at stake.
The sweeping secrecy that the Sims Court has sanctioned effectively blocks
public and press efforts to evaluate CIA performance, thus making
accountability difficult, if not impossible. Indeed, the CIA's widely publicized
failures in connection with the 9/11 terrorist attacks illustrate the folly of
unchecked secrecy, which not only cloaks questionable Agency activities but
also conceals grave problems in CIA management. These problems were
further evidenced in the CIA's miscalculations and false assessments of Iraqi
3
weapons strength, which were used to justify the American invasion oflraq?
Over the years, the Sims precedent has blocked access to CIA-held

12. 150 CONG. REc. S11939-01, 12001 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2004).

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
at 3638-3872.
See infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
471 U.S.159(1985).
5
§ 552 (2005).
19. 471
159
20. Id. at 168-70.
21. Id. at 183-84 (Marshall, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 190 (Marshall, J., concurring).
23. REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ, S. Rep. No. 108-301 (2004)
[hereinafter PREWAR INTELLIGENCE REPORT].
13.
118 Stat.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

u.s.c.
u.s.
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information in a long line of cases that cover a wide array of issues of public
24
interest. In 2004, for example, the Supreme Court let stand a federal appellate
court decision that cited Sims repeatedly in its rationale to allow the
government to withhold basic information on persons detained after the
25
terrorist attacks.
The authors believe that Sims was wrongly decided in 1985, but this
Article intends to show that, right or wrong, Sims is no longer controlling
precedent when viewed in light of the Intelligence Reform Act. This Article
asserts that the CIA's ability to deny FOIA requests should be sharply
circumscribed in accordance with a new information paradigm of maximum
dissemination as established in the Act. Part I discusses the FOIA, its statutory
exemptions and its legislative history. Part II examines the Sims decision and
argues that the Court's ruling contravened Congress's intent to require the
fullest disclosure possible under the FOIA. Part III summarizes the changes
established by the Intelligence Reform Act and examines the legislative history
of the Act to clarify the plain meaning of its text. This Article concludes that
the Intelligence Reform Act offers a new intelligence information policy that
recognizes that carte blanche CIA secrecy has been outmoded and
acknowledges that this nation has experienced a profound shift in terms of what

24. See, e.g., Arabian Shield Dev. Co. v. CIA, No. 3-98-CV-0624-BD, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2379, at *14 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 1999), aff'd per curiam, 208 F.3d 1007 (5th Cir.
2000) (rejecting a rival bidder's request for the unclassified records on CIA involvement in
the award of an oil-production agreement with the former Yemen Arab Republic);
Assassination Archives & Research Ctr. v. CIA, 334 F.3d 55 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (rejecting a
request for a forty-year-old CIA compilation of the biographies of Cuban leaders); Ctr. for
Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124
S.Ct. 1041 (2004) (rejecting a request for basic information on persons detained after the
9/11 attacks); Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1993) (withholding information
concerning the disappearance of a pilot during a flight over Cuba in 1961. The request was
made by his former wife in 1993.); Knight v. CIA, 872 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1989) (rejecting a
request for information concerning the sabotage of the Greenpeace vessel "Rainbow
Warrior," which was bombed and sank in a New Zealand harbor in 1985); Fitzgibbon v.
CIA, 911 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (rejecting a request for access to forty-year-old CIA
records on an alleged plot by Dominican Republic government agents to kidnap President
John F. Kennedy's daughter Caroline); Rubin v. CIA, 01 Civ. 2274 (DLC), 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19413 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2001) (rejecting a doctoral student's request for
information on the participation of deceased British poets Stephen Spender and T.S. Eliot in
a CIA-funded E).lfopean cultural organization); Aftergood ex rei. Fed'n of Am. Scientists v.
CIA, Civ. No. 98-2107 (TFH), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18135 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 1999)
(rejecting a request for the Clinton Administration's budget proposal for CIA intelligencerelated activities in 1999).
25. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004) (holding that the government can withhold the 9/11
detainees' names, their attorneys' names, dates of arrest or release, locations of arrest and
detention, and reasons for detention). In this case, the Justice Department relied principally
on Exemption 7, the FOIA exemption for law enforcement records. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)
(2005). However, the case cited Sims at least eleven times as legal authority to withhold
information on the detainees that had been obtained or held by the CIA.
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the public has come to expect to know about what their government is doing in
their name.
I. THE FOIA AND OPEN GOVERNMENT
Government secrecy in matters of American national security has a history
6
as old as the nation.Z Often, however, the government's need for
confidentiality in defending the nation and in conducting foreign relations
conflicts with the democratic principles of an open society and the First
27
Amendment rights of citizens to debate important national policy issues. CIA
v. Sims illustrates this clash between the competing democratic values of
28
government transparency and the practical needs for government secrecy.
The challenge that faced the Sims Court was to resolve the conflict between the
opposin:§ policy objectives evinced in the Freedom of Information Act
30
(FOIA) and the National Security Act. This Part discusses the FOIA and its
legislative history.
Congress enacted the FOIA in 1966 and has amended it in significant
31
respects over the past forty years. The FOIA applies to records held by the
dozens of varied executive branch agencies, such as the Federal Labor
Relations Authority, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Environmental
Protection Agency. It also applies to the cabinet offices, such as the
departments of State, Defense and Commerce, and includes sub-departments
32
such as the FBI. The statute makes these records available to "any person"

26. See Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes Home:
Executive Power and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 349, 349-50
(1986). For example, in the first twenty-nine essays of THE FEDERALIST, the main argument
for the Constitution, as set forth by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay,
focused on the risks of foreign war and influence. See id. A decade earlier, George
Washington wrote to one of his secret agents during the War of Independence: "The
necessity of procuring good intelligence, is apparent and need not be further urged. All that
remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon
secrecy, success depends in most Enterprises of the kind, and for want of it they are
generally defeated ...." Sims, 471 U.S. at 172 n.16, (citing Letter from George Washington
to Colonel Elias Dayton (July 26, 1777), in 8 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 478-79 (J.
Fitzpatrick ed., 1933).
27. See Edgar and Schmidt, supra note 26, at 352.
28. Sims, 471 U.S. at 190 (Marshall, J., concurring).
29. 5 u.s.c. § 552 (2005).
30. National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343,61 Stat. 495-510 (1947).
31. The FOIA was amended in 1974, 1976, 1986, and 1996. Freedom of Information
Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974); Government in the
Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986); and Electronic Freedom of Information Act
Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. l 04-231, ll 0 Stat 3048 (1996).
32. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE & POLICY
OVERVIEW MAY 28, 2002 [hereinafter FOIA GUIDE].
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33

upon request. A FOIA requester is not required to explain why a record is
being requested, and the burden is on the government to explain why disclosure
4
is refused? The FOIA does not apply to records held by state or local
governments, Congress, the courts, municipal corporations, private individuals,
private companies, or private entities holding federal contracts. 35
Since its enactment, the FOIA has proved to be a valuable tool for
informing the public about important issues of public interest and for fillin§
3
gaps in history with previously overlooked or concealed information.
Congress has noted that the FOIA has "led to the disclosure of waste, fraud,
abuse, and wrongdoing" in the federal government, and the "identification of
37
unsafe consumer products, harmful drugs, and serious health hazards."
The FOIA creates a judicially enforceable policy that embodies a strong
38
grounded in the principle of
presumption "of full agency disclosure"
accountability that in a representative democracy, the "public as a whole has a
39
right to know what its Government is doing." As the Supreme Court observed
in an early FOIA opinion, "The basic purpose of [the] FOIA is to ensure an
informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to
check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the
40
governed. "
33. 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (2005). See also Sims, 471 U.S. at 182 (Marshall, J., concurring).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (2005). Before the FOIA was signed into law, the public and

press had no legal remedy when they were denied access to government-held information.
H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 5 (1966). The FOIA replaced Section 3 of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) of 1946. Administrative Procedure Act, 79 Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat.
238 (1946). APA Section 3 ostensibly was a public information provision to allow the public
to gain access to "matters of official record" held by the federal government. S. REP. No. 89813, at 4 (1965). But the law was "full of loopholes which allow agencies to deny legitimate
information to the public. Innumerable times it appears that information is withheld only to
cover up embarrassing mistakes or irregularities .... " S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3.
35. FOIA GUIDE, supra note 32, at 29-31.
36. See H.R. REP. No. 104-795, §§ 2(a)(3) & (4) (1996).
37. /d. In recent years, for example, the Philadelphia Inquirer used the FOIA to learn
that federal citations for pollution law violations plummeted during the early years of the
George W. Bush administration, dropping thirty-five percent in 2002-2003 compared to the
previous year. Seth Borenstein, Pollution Citations Plummet Under Bush, THE PHILA.
INQUIRER, Dec. 9, 2003, at AI. The Dayton Daily News obtained government documents
under the FOIA disclosing that the government largely ignored sexual assault charges
brought by women in the military against enlisted men and officers. FOI SERV. CTR.,
REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, HOW TO USE THE FEDERAL FOI ACT 2
(Rebecca Daugherty ed., 9th ed. 2004). And the San Francisco Chronicle acquired records
that revealed that during the 1950s and 1960s, the FBI covertly campaigned to fire
University of California President Clark Kerr and conspired with the CIA director to
pressure the California Board of Regents to force out liberal professors. Seth Rosenfeld,
Winning Series Uncovers FBI Secrets Using the FOIA, THE BRECHNER REPORT, 8 (Dec.
2003).
38. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3.
39. /d. at 5.
40. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
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The FOIA's legislative history reflects that Congress was guided by a
philosophy that linked a policy of full agency disclosure to a democratic
41
society. A 1965 Senate report, which is widely considered by Congress and
the Supreme Court as the leading indicator of the FOIA's legislative intent, 42
instructs that: "[a] government by secrecy benefits no one .... It breeds
43
mistrust, dampens the fervor of its citizens, and mocks their loyalty." In the
years since the statute was signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson on
44
July 4, 1966, Con§ress has repeatedly reiterated this presumption of
5
government o,Renness, and the Supreme Court has consistently recognized
6
this principle.
Although the FOIA's crafters understood that citizens in a democracy must
have access to government information in order to make informed decisions, 47
lawmakers also recognized that at times secrecy is necessary for the
48
government to function effectively.
Congress, therefore, created nine
statutory exemptions that cover certain categories of information that agencies
49
may, but are not required to, withhold. Congress and the courts have made it
clear that the exemptions are limited, and outside of these enumerated
50
categories, "all citizens have a right to know." Lawmakers declared that the
statute thus provides a "workable formula which encompasses, balances, and
protects all interests, yet places emphasis on the fullest responsible

41. See generally S. REP. No. 89-813; H.R. REP. No. 89-1497 (1965). See also Michael
Hoefges, Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, Privacy Rights Versus FOIA Disclosure
Policy: The "Uses and Effects" Double Standard in Access to Personally Identifiable
!'!formation in Government Records, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 9-10 (2003).
42. In a series of majority opinions, the Supreme Court has cited this 1965 Senate
report as the primary indicator of the FOIA's legislative purpose. Justice Byron White wrote:
"Without question, the Act is broadly conceived. It seeks to permit access to official
information long shielded unnecessarily from public view and attempts to ... secure such
information from possibly unwilling official hands." EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973)
(citing S. REP. No. 89-813). Justice William J. Brennan wrote that the FOIA's "basic
purpose reflected 'a general philosophy of full agency disclosure."' Dep't of Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360 (1976) (quoting S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3).
43. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 10.
44. See Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966).
45. See infra notes 53 to 93 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't ofDef. v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487,493-94 (1994); U.S. Dep't of
Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 755 (1989); Robbins
Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. at 220; Rose, 425 U.S. at 360-61; Mink, 410 U.S. at 80.
47. See H. REP. No. 89-1497, at 2-3, 5-6 (1965).
48. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3.
49. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l-9) (2005). The FOIA does not apply to matters that fall under
the categories of (I) classified information and national security; (2) internal agency
personnel information; (3) information exempted by statutes; (4) trade secrets and other
confidential business information; (5) agency memoranda; (6) disclosures that invade
personal privacy; (7) law enforcement investigation records; (8) reports from regulated
financial institutions; and (9) geological and geophysical information.
50. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 6.
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51

disclosure." The Supreme Court has noted that the FOIA exemptions are
strictly limited and "do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy,
52
is the dominant objective of the Act."
Congress strengthened the FOIA in 1974 through several amendments,
which were prompted in great part by the Watergate scandal during the Richard
53
M. Nixon Administration. One of the major changes was a substantial
revision of Exemption 1, the national security exemption, which is the only
FOIA exemption that allows the executive branch, rather than Congress, to
54
determine the criteria for disclosing information. We tum next to an analysis
of Exemption I, which surfaced as a critical and divisive issue among the
55
Court's justices in CIA v. Sims.
The legislative history of the 1974
amendments plainly shows that Congress revised Exemption 1 explicitly to
reiterate its intent to grant public access to federal agency records whenever
56
possible--even when national security issues are raised.
A. The National Security Exemption
Under Exemption 1's current language, which was crafted in 1974, the
FOIA does not apply to matters that are both "specifically authorized under
criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign polic1 and are in fact properly classified pursuant
5
to such Executive order . . . ." Exemption 1's original 1966 language said
only that the FOIA did not apply to matters "specifically required by executive
58
order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy."
The revised language reflects Congress' intention to provide for judicial review
of purportedly classified documents to confirm that the material does indeed
fall under the enumerated categories of information that can be classified under
51. Id.at3.

52. Rose, 425 U.S. at 361.
53. Freedom of Information, Executive Privilege, Secrecy in Government: Hearing
Before the Subcomms. on Administrative Practice and Procedure and Separation of Powers
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, and the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the
Comm. on Governmental Operations, 93d Cong. 209-10 (1973) ("Government secrecy
breeds Government deceit . . . . High government officials sat around in the Attorney
General's office calmly discussing the commission of bugging and mugging and kidnapping
and blackmail .... Federal officials who want their activities to remain hidden from public
view are going to have to tell us why, and their reasons are going to have to be very
convincing and very specific") (statement ofU.S. Sen. Edward Kennedy).
54. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(l) (2005).
55. See Sims, 471 U.S. at 188-90 (Marshall, J., concurring).
56. See An Act to Amend the Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88
Stat. 1561, 1-3 (1974) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2005)); H.R. REP.
No. 93-876, at 12 (1974); S. REP. No. 93-1200, at 12 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6290.
57. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l) (2005) (emphasis added).
58. /d.
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an executive order and to verify that the material was classified according to
59
prescribed procedures.
The 1974 amendment's check on mere assertions by the government that
withheld information was classified came as a direct congressional response to
a 1973 Supreme Court decision that restricted access to records on national
60
This case
security grounds, Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink.
concerned a FOIA request by Hawaiian U.S. Representative Patsy Mink, who
asked the government to release environmental impact statements contained in
61
a report on a planned underground nuclear test off the Alaskan coast. The
government refused to release the documents, arguing that the report was
classified "top secret," and any material contained in the report was exempt
62
Mink brought suit against the
from disclosure under Exemption I.
.
h
.
163
government to obtam t e matena .
In a decisive seven-to-one opinion written by Justice Byron R. White, the
Supreme Court held that classified documents were exempt from judicial
review, and the government could meet its Exemption 1 burden simply by
offering an affidavit that declared that the requested information was
64
classified. White reasoned that Exemption I 's plain text was ambiguous and
provided no explicit oversight process to review whether proper procedure was
65
used to classify a document.
He concluded that the national security
exemption neither permitted nor compelled in camera inspection by judges to
66
sort out documents that were not classified. The Mink Court thus held that an
agency's mere assertion that requested material was classified was sufficient to
. 'fy nond.1scIosure. 67
JUStl
Congress responded swiftly to the Mink Court's ruling. Declaring that the
68
Court had contravened the FOIA's legislative intent, lawmakers revised
69
Exemption 1. Under Exemption 1's new language, courts were allowed to

59. See H.R. REP. No. 93-876, at 12; S. REP. No. 93-1200, at 12; 88 Stat. 1561.
60. Mink, 410 U.S. at 73.
61. !d. at 75.
62. !d.

63. Mink sued in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to obtain the
information under the FOIA, and the court granted summary judgment in favor of the
government. Mink, 410 U.S. at 78. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed the decision, ruling that the national security exemption allowed the
executive branch to withhold only the portions of the requested documents that were
classified, not the entire record. The court of appeals directed the lower court to conduct an
in camera review of the files to determine whether the specific information requested was
not classified and could be released. !d.
64. !d. at 84-85.
65. !d. at 83.
66. !d. at 81.
67. !d. at 83-84.
68. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, at 12 (1974); S. REP. No. 93-1200, at 12 (1974).
69. 88 Stat. at 1561.
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exercise de novo judicial review, including in camera inspection of documents,
to look beyond the mere claim that material had been classified and to confirm
70
that classification was proper. In other words, the courts can review a
document to make sure that it was withheld according to the President's
executive order on Classified National Security Information, which sets out
both substantive and procedural criteria for withholding national security
71
information. Substantive criteria enumerate which categories of information
may be classified, and procedural criteria explain the strict process by which
72
national security information is classified.
73
In addition to establishing judicial review in an Exemption l FOIA case,
the 1974 amendments further strengthened the right to know by requiring all
agencies to segregate and release nonexempt information from a record that
74
contains exempt information. As this Article will demonstrate in the next
Part, it is significant to note that Congress explicitly intended that the
75
segregation-and-disclosure rule applied to Exemption 1.
By amending Exemption 1 to require de novo judicial review, and by
establishing that the segregation-and-disclosure requirement applies even to
matters of national security, Congress took its first step to explicitly check
exclusive CIA authority over whether to release a government record. Two
years later, Congress for the second time nullified a Supreme Court FOIA
decision that granted agencies too much discretion over nondisclosure
decisions.

70. /d.
71. See S.

REP. No. 93-1200. Presidential classification standards vary from
administration to administration. See, e.g., George W. Bush Admin. Exec. Order No. 13,292,
68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 28, 2003); William J. Clinton Admin. Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60
Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 20, 1995); Ronald Reagan-George H.W. Bush Admin. Exec. Order
No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R., 166 (1982); Jimmy Carter Admin. Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R.
190 (1978). [Eds. BB 14.7 says not to include the name of the president who issued the
order, but including it seems to make sense in this context]
72. For example, some of the categories mentioned in the current executive order
include military plans, programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities, foreign
relations activities and intelligence operations. See George W. Bush Admin. Exec. Order No.
13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 28, 2003). Regarding process, only specifically
designated officials may classify information, and classified information must be marked to
show the identity of the classification authority, the classification level, and classification
instructions. /d.
73. Under Exemption I 's revised language, judicial oversight is still strictly limited. A
judge cannot challenge the classification standards adopted by a president; a judge can only
determine whether the information was classified according to its content and proper
procedure as set forth in an executive order.
74. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2005). See also FOIA GUIDE supra note 32, at 122-23.
75. See Oglesby v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 79 F.3d 1172, 1180-81 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
Krikorian v. U.S. Dep't of State, 984 F.2d 461,466-67 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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B. Congress Restricts Agency Discretion
In 1976, Congress revised the FOIA again-this time to restrict an
76
agency's discretion when an agency invokes Exemption 3 as ground for
77
nondisclosure. Under FOIA Exemption 3, agencies can refuse a FOIA request
for information if that information is shielded from disclosure under ant other
8
federal statutes, including statutes enacted before the FOIA was passed. This
amendment pertains directly to CIA v. Sims because the CIA refused disclosure
79
on the ground that the National Security Act qualified as an Exemption 3
80
wtt. hh old"mg statute.
81
In Administrator, FAA v. Robertson, a consumer rights group requested
FAA reports in 1975 on the operations and maintenance performance of
commercial aircraft. The FAA withheld the information, asserting that Section
82
1104 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 qualified as a withholding statute
83
under Exemption 3. Section 1104 allowed the administrator broad discretion
to withhold a requested record when, in the administrator's view, disclosure
84
would adversely affect the agency and was not required in the;mblic interest.
8
The consumer rights group sued to gain access to the reports.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed decisions by the D.C. District
Court and the D.C. Circuit Court, both of which had ordered disclosure of the
reports. Chief Justice Warren Burger, writing for the Court, upheld the FAA
Administrator's broad discretion to withhold records, holding that a statute
need not precisely identify specific categories of data that may be withheld in
86
order to qualify as a withholding statute under Exemption 3. Justices William
0. Douglas and William J. Brennan dissented, supporting the lower courts'
view that Section 1104's discretionary nature and vague ~ublic interest
7
standard gave the agency more discretion than the FOIA allows.
76. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(3) (2005).
77. H.R. REP. No. 94-880, at pt. 1, 23 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 220405. See also Sims v. CIA, 642 F.2d 562, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
78. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2005); see FOIA GUIDE, supra note 32, at 154.
79. National Security Act of 1947.
80. Sims, 471 U.S. 159.
81. Administrator, FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975).
82. 49 u.s.c. § 1504 (1982).
83. Robertson, 422 U.S. at 265-67 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1504).
84. Id. at 259.
85. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled against the government,
holding that Section 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act did not qualify as an exempting statute
under Exemption 3. Robertson v. Butterfield, No. 71-1970 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 31, 1972). The
D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the discretionary nature of
Section 1104 and its vague public interest standard were insufficient for it to qualify as a
specific exempting statute under the meaning of Exemption 3. Robertson v. Butterfield, 498
F.2d 1031, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
86. Administrator, FAA, 422 U.S. at 266-67.
87. /d. at 268 (Douglas, J., & Brennan, J., dissenting).
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In response to the Robertson opinion, Congress revised Exemption 3
88
explicitly to restrict an agency executive's discretion to withhold information.
In its original 1966 language, Exemption 3 said only that the FOIA did not
89
apply to matters "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute." Congress
amended this language in 1976 with the addition of a limiting two-part test.
Under the revised language, the FOIA does not apply to matters that are
"specifically exempted from disclosure by statute . . . , provided that such
statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a
manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular
criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be
90
withheld." Echoing the dissenting opinion by Justices Douglas and Brennan,
lawmakers said they made these changes because the Court's broad
construction of Exemption 3's 1966 plain text gave too much discretion to
agency officials and conflicted with Congress's intent to provide as much
91
disclosure as possible. Congress declared that the Supreme Court's majority
interpreted Exemption 3 in a way that granted the FAA Administrator "carte
92
blanche to withhold any information he pleases."
As this Part has shown, the FOIA's strong presumption for disclosure is
evinced clearly in its plain text and has been reiterated frequently through its
93
extensive legislative history. This policy stands in sharp relief against the
94
objectives ofthe National Security Act of 1947, which was the statutory basis
95
that the CIA invoked to justify withholding in CIA v. Sims.

88. H.R. REP. No. 94-880, pt. 1, at 23 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 220405.
89. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1966) (prior to the 1976 amendment).
90. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(3) (2005).
91. H.R. REP. No. 94-880, pt. 1, at 23.
92. !d.
93. In 1996, the last time Congress amended the FOIA, lawmakers nullified a Ninth
Circuit Court opinion because, in Congress's judgment, the ruling contravened the FOIA's
legislative intent to require as much disclosure as possible. In SDC Development Corp. v.
Mathews, 542 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1976), the Ninth Circuit Court upheld the government's
right to withhold a computerized database on the ground that electronically recorded and
stored information does not qualify as "agency record" under the FOIA. The House report
that accompanied the 1996 amendments (commonly known as the Electronic Freedom of
Information Act of 1996) rejected the Ninth Circuit Court's decision, emphasizing that
government-held information in any form, including electronic or computerized formats, is
subject to the FOIA's disclosure requirements and strong presumption of disclosure. See
H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 20 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448,3463.
94. National Security Act of 1947.
95. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985).
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II. CIA V. SIMS
CIA v. Sims concerned a FOIA request for records detailing a series of
96
illegal CIA psychological experiments conducted in the United States
97
between 1953 and 1966. This research, code-named "MKULTRA," was
authorized in an effort to compete with Soviet and Chinese experiments in
98
brainwashing and interrogation techniques. About eighty private and public
research facilities-including several major American universities such as
99
Stanford, Harvard and Princeton, along with various hospitals and prisons participated in the clandestine project in which unsuspectin~ subjects were
00
given then-experimental drugs such as LSD and mescaline.
In all, 185
researchers were involved. In some of the experiments, subjects were picked up
in bars by prostitutes, given drugs, and then taken for observation to CIA
safehouses in New York and San Francisco that were equipped with recording
101
devices and two-way mirrors.
As a result of these and other experiments, at
102
least two persons died and others suffered health problems.
Information about these experiments and other questionable CIA activities,
such as domestic spying during the Vietnam War era, was leaked to the press
and reported in newspapers; this information prompted Congress to investigate
103
CIA operations.
Public Citizen, a Ralph Nader organization, filed a FOIA
request for the CIA's MKUL TRA records, seeking the names of the research
facilities, the identities of the researchers, and the details of the project's

96. These CIA psychological tests were an illegal violation of the charter that
established the Agency. Under the National Security Act, the CIA was specifically denied
powers of domestic intelligence gathering, specifically, "no police, subpoena, or law
enforcement powers or internal security functions." Pub. L. No. 80-253, § 102(d)(3)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403-4(d)(l)).
97. Sims, 471 U.S. at 161-62.
98. !d.
99. Also included among the universttles that were identified are Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Cornell, and the University of Michigan. Sims v. CIA, 479 F. Supp.
84, 85 n.2 (1979).
100. Sims, 471 U.S. at 161-62.
101. MARTIN A. LEE AND BRUCE SHLAIN, ACID DREAMS: THE CIA, LSD, AND THE
SIXTIES REBELLION 32 (1985).
102. Sims, 471 U.S. at 159-60, 162 n.4; LEE & SHLAIN, supra note 101, at 29-31; See
also 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 89.
103. News reports that the CIA had engaged in illegal activities and abuses were
published in 1974 by The New York Times. See, e.g., Seymour Hersh, Huge CIA Operation
Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 22, 1974, at AI, Al6. The first congressional probe resulted in the Rockefeller
Commission Report in 1975, which disclosed details of the MKULTRA operation.
Consequently, Sen. Frank Church was named to head a Senate committee to further
investigate those and other allegations. Sims v. CIA (Sims/), 642 F.2d 562, 564 (D.C. Cir.
1980). See also BOB WOODWARD, SHADOW: FIVE PRESIDENTS AND THE LEGACY OF
WATERGATE42 (1999).
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104

research contracts and grants.
The CIA disclosed the names of fifty-nine
research facilities and the terms of the contracts, but refused to name twentyone other facilities and kept secret the identities of all the project's
105
researchers.
Public Citizen sued to obtain the remaining records, embarking on an
eight-year-long court fight that ended in 1985 when the Supreme Court ruled
that the CIA could withhold the information on the ground that the National
Security Act of 1947 106 granted the DCI broad . discretion to protect
107
"intelligence sources and methods" from unauthorized disclosure.
A. The Supreme Court Majority Opinion
CIA v. Sims reached the Supreme Court after the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that an "intelligence source" is defined as
someone who is promised confidentiality and whose information could not be
108
obtained through other means.
Under this definition, the CIA would have

104. Sims, 471 U.S. at 162-64. John Cary Sims was the Public Citizen attorney who
filed the lawsuit. A second respondent, Sidney M. Wolfe, M.D., was director of Public
Citizen Health Research Group. Id. at 162-63.
105. Sims, 471 U.S. at 163. It was revealed during the committee hearings headed by
Sen. Church that, in 1973, CIA Director Richard Helms had ordered all MKULTRA records
and documents destroyed to avoid their ever being disclosed. However, in a bizarre and
unexpected revelation, a CIA staff member testified that he discovered about 8000 pages of
documents that inadvertently escaped destruction. The information sought by Public Citizen
was contained in these records. Id. at 163 n.5. See also JAMES X. DEMPSEY, The CIA and
Secrecy, in A CULTURE OF SECRECY: THE GOVERNMENT VERSUS THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO
KNow 41-42 (Athan G. Theoharis, ed., 1998).
106. National Security Act of 1947.
107. See Sims, 471 U.S. at 174-77.
108. Sims v. CIA (Sims II), 709 F.2d 95, 99-100 (1983). Before reaching the Supreme
Court, the Sims case was heard by lower courts in Sims v. CIA, 479 F.Supp. 84 (D.D.C.
1979); Sims v. CIA (Sims I), 642 F.2d 562 (D.C. Cir. 1980); and Sims v. CIA (Sims II), 709
F.2d 95 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Initially, the D.C. District Court held that the names of institutions and researchers
could not be withheld because they were not "intelligence sources" within the meaning of
Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947. The district court reasoned that in
order for the CIA director to declare the researchers to be "intelligence sources," there must
be "clear, non-discretionary guidelines to test whether an intelligence source is involved in a
particular case." Sims, 479 F. Supp. at 87-88.
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court held in Sims I that the district court's analysis of
Section 102(d)(3) lacked a coherent definition of "intelligence sources." The D.C. Circuit
Court remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration based on a definition of
"intelligence sources" crafted by the appellate court:
(A)n 'intelligence source' is a person or institution that provides, has provided or
has been engaged to provide the CIA with information of a kind the Agency needs
to perform its intelligence function effectively, yet could not reasonably expect to
obtain without guaranteeing the confidentially of those who provide it. Sims I. 642
F.2d at 571.
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been required to release the names of MKUL TRA researchers who did not
explicitly request confidentiality. Both sides appealed because the Agency
wanted to withhold all the names in question, whereas Public Citizen wanted
all the identities disclosed.
Chief Justice Burger writing for the Court majority, framed two principal
109
issues in Sims v. CIA:
whether Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security
110
Act qualified as a withholding statute under FOIA Exemption 3,
and
whether the MKUL TRA researchers qualified as "intelligence sources" under
111
Section I 02(d)(3).
1. The National Security Act

After World War II, the National Security Act was enacted by Congress to
reorganize the nation's military and intelligence establishments and to mandate
112
changes in foreign policy.
The law was approved in the aftermath of harsh
government and public criticism over the inadequate performance of U.S.
113
intelligence operations in connection with the attack on Pearl Harbor.
A
1947 Senate report that accompanied the National Security Act pointed to this
nation's "limited intelligence of the designs and capacities of our enemies" as
convincing evidence that the United States "would be imperiled were we to
ignore the cost!?,; lessons of the war and fail to ... prevent the recurrence of
1 4
these defects."
The National Security Act created the CIA and the National Security
Council in an effort to improve the nation's ability to gather and analyze
intelligence information not only during times of war but also during
115
peacetime.
The CIA was formerly known as the Central Intelligence Group,
116
one of a number of small decentralized postwar intelligence groups.
The
National Security Act authorized the CIA to be the exclusive organization for

On remand, the district court held that the CIA should disclose the identities of
researchers who did not request confidentiality and ordered the Agency to disclose the
names of the forty-seven researchers. On a second appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court held in
Sims II that the district court incorrectly applied the definition of "intelligence sources." The
D.C. Circuit Court clarified that a researcher could be considered an "intelligence source"
only if the researcher is promised confidentiality, and the information provided by the
researcher could not be obtained through other means. Sims II, 709 F.2d at 99-100. After the
D.C. Circuit Court's Sims II decision, both sides appealed to the Supreme Court. CIA v.
Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985).
109. Sims, 471 U.S. at 167.
110. !d. at 167,177-81.
Ill. !d. at 167,175-77.
112. S. REP. No. 80-239, at 2-3 (1947); see also H.R. REP. No. 80-961, at 2-3 (1947).
113. S. REP. No. 80-239, at 2-3; see also H.R. REP. No. 80-961, at 2-3.
114. S. REP. No. 80-239, at 2.
115. See H.R. REP. No. 80-961, at 2-3.
116. See id.
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117

collecting and evaluating foreign intelligence information.
The Sims majority's decision was based principally on a key provision in
the National Security Act that made the DCI "responsible for protecting
118
The
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."
majority held that this statutory mandate qualified the National Security Act as
119
a withholding statute under FOIA Exemption 3.
However, neither the National Security Act's plain text nor its legislative
history ever defined "intelligence sources" or provided clarifying language for
this term, thus leading to the second issue identified by the Sims Court: whether
the MKUL TRA researchers qualified as "intelligence sources" under Section
102(d)(3). In order to resolve this question, the Sims Court needed to settle on a
definition for "intelligence sources."
At the outset, the Court majority rejected the D.C. Circuit Court's
definition of "intelligence sources." Under the appellate court's interpretation
of Section 102(d)(3), the CIA director is authorized to protect intelligence
sources from disclosure under the FOIA only if such confidentiality is needed
120
to obtain information that could not be acquired by other means.
The
Supreme Court reasoned that this defmition was drawn too narrowly and would
121
result in disclosure of more information than should be made public.
Had
Congress intended such a limitation, Burger argued, lawmakers would have
122
drafted legislation that narrowed the category of protected sources.
In the
judgment of the Court majority, a narrow interpretation of "intelligence
sources" ignored the practical necessities of intelligence gathering and the
123
unique responsibilities of the Agency:
"To keep informed of other nations'
activities bearing on our national security the Agency must rely on a host of
sources. At the same time, the Director must have the authority to shield those
Agency activities and sources from any disclosure that would unnecessarily
124
compromise the Agency's efforts."
The Court therefore fashioned a new definition: "An intelligence source
provides, or is engaged to provide, information the Agency needs to fulfill its
125
statutory obligations .... related to the Agency's intelligence function."

117. National Security Act of 1947: Hearing on H.R. 2319 Before the Comm. on
Expenditures in the Exec. Dep't, 80th Cong, 5-6 (1947).
118. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 167-68 (1985) (citing 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3)).
119. Sims, 471 U.S. at 167.
120. !d. at 169.
121. !d. at 169-70.
122. !d. at 169.
123. !d.
124. Id.
125. !d. at 177. It is noteworthy that the source for this definition was the CIA itself.
The original language for the CIA's proposed definition for "intelligence sources" can be
found in Agency briefs filed with the D.C. Circuit Court in Sims I, 642 F.2d at 576 n.l.

2006]

OF SECRETS AND SPIES

369

2. Defining the Term 'Intelligence Sources'
Burger said the Supreme Court's definition of "intelligence sources"
comports with the National Security Act's plain text and legislative history,
which suggest a broad authority for the CIA director to protect all sources of
126
intelligence information from disclosure.
Burger reasoned that the
government has a compelling interest in protecting not only secret information
crucial to national security, but also the appearance of confidentiality, which is
127
essential to the effective operation of the CIA.
The Chief Justice quoted
Allen W. Dulles, one of the CIA's founders and CIA director from 1953 to
1961, who said that even sources who freely supply intelligence information
would "close up like a clam" unless they can count on the government for
. 1' 128
compete
1 entia tty.
1 confid
Burger frequently stressed the importance of showing "great deference" to
Agency discretion, particularly decisions made by the DCI to withhold
129
Burger wrote that the DCI is granted broad powers specifically
information.
130
through Section 102(d)(3),
and the granting of such power is sound policy
because the director is the only person familiar with the whole intelligence
picture. According to Burger, the DCI is the person best suited to determine
whether individual pieces of information-although not obviously important by
131
"The decisions of
themselves--can reveal intelligence sources and methods.
the Director, who must of course be familiar with 'the whole picture,' as judges
are not, are worthy of great deference given the magnitude of the national
132
security interests and potential risks at stake." Burger flatly rejected the idea
that judges should have the power of de novo review in FOIA litigation for
133
CIA-held information.
Burger asserted that de novo review in CIA cases
poses inherent dangers because judges have "little or no background in the
134
delicate business of intelligence gathering."
To defend the Court's sweeping definition of "intelligence sources" and to
further bolster the Sims Court's rationale for granting the DCI broad and
unreviewable authority over disclosure decisions under the FOIA, Burger
pointed to an amendment to the National Security Act, known as the Central
135
The amendment's legislative
Intelligence Agency Information Act of 1984.
history shows that the law was enacted after years of prodding by the Agency,

126. Sims, 471 U.S. at 169-170, 173.
127. !d. at 175.

128. !d.
129. !d. at 179.
130. /d.at170.
131. !d. at 178.
132. !d. at 179.
133. !d. at 176.
134. !d.
135. !d. at 168 n.11, 174 n.19, citing Pub. L. No. 98-477, 98 Stat. 2009 (1984).
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which wanted Congress to provide additional assurance that CIA sources would
136
remain confidentiai.
The 1984 amendment exempted the CIA's "operational files" from
137
disclosure under the FOIA.
Some examples of information contained in
operational files include details about organizational structure, numbers of
personnel assigned to certain functions, and personnel names, titles, and
salaries. The House report accompanying the amendment described operational
files as those that consist of "records which, after line-by-line security review,
almost invariably prove not to be releasable under the FOIA. ... A decade of
experience has shown that certain specifically identifiable CIA operational
records systems, containing the most sensitive information directly concerning
intelligence sources and methods, inevitably contain few, if any, items which
138
can be disclosed to FOIA requesters."
Therefore, these files were shielded
from disclosure, because the CIA wanted relief from bureaucratic requirements
139
to comply with certain FOIA ~equests that the Agency typically rejected.
The CIA Information Act is particularly relevant to this Article's analysis
because, unlike the National Security Act, the CIA Information Act was
approved after FOIA's enactment. While Burger focused mainly on a provision
of the CIA Information Act that enhanced confidentiality by exempting
140
"operational files,"
he ignored key language that actuall(' limits agency
14
discretion over all other CIA documents and records.
Although the
amendment exempted CIA "operational files" from disclosure, it also made
142
clear that remaining Agency files are subject to the FOIA.
The House report
that accompanied the CIA Information Act clearly stated that one of the
purposes for exempting operational files was to improve the CIA's ability to
respond to FOIA requests "in a timely and efficient manner, while preserving
undiminished the amount of meaningful information releasable to the

136. H.R. REP. No. 98-726, at 4 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3742.
137. P.L. 98-477, 98 Stat. 2209 (1984) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 431); see also H.R.
REP. No. 98-726, at 4 (House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence). The CIA
Information Act defines "operational files" as "(1) files of the Directorate of Operations
which document the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence operations or
intelligence or security liaison arrangements of information exchanges with foreign
governments or their intelligence or security services; (2) files of the Directorate for Science
and Technology which document the means by which foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence is collected through scientific and technical systems; and (3) files of the
Office of Security which document investigations conducted to determine the suitability of
potential foreign intelligence or counterintelligence sources." P.L. 98-477, 98 Stat. 2209
(1984) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 431).
138. H.R. REP. No. 98-726, at 4-5.
139. I d. at 4.
140. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 168 n.11, 174 n.19 (1985).
141. See 50 U.S.C. § 431,98 Stat. 2209,2209-2210 (2005).
142. Pub. L. No. 98-477, 98 Stat. 2209-2212 (1984).
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The report declared:

The Agency's acceptance of the obligation under the FOIA to provide information
to the public not exempted under the FOIA is one of the linchpins of this
legislation. The [FOIA] has played a vital part in maintaining the American
people's faith in their government, and particularly in agencies like the CIA that
must necessarily operate in secrecy. In a free society, a national security agency's
ability to serve the national interest depends as much on public confidence that its
powers will not be misused as it does on the confidence of intelligence sources that
their relationships with the CIA will be protected. 144

Furthermore, the CIA Information Act of 1984 contained provisions that
145
For
explicitly authorize CIA disclosure obligations under the FOIA.
example, the Act states that operational files "shall continue to be subject to
search and review" for information subject to investigations by Congress, the
Department of Justice, or other investigatory bodies into improper or unlawful
146
activities.
Another provision requires that the Agency consult with the
Archivist of the United States, the Librarian of Congress, and appropriate
representatives selected by the Archivist in order to conduct periodic and
systematic reviews of documents for their historical value, their
147
declassification, and their release.
Finally, and most importantly, the CIA Information Act reiterates that the
FOIA establishes that judicial review, including in camera inspection, is
available to a FOIA requester who alleges that the CIA has withheld a record
148
improperly.
In fact, Burger's assertion in Sims that de novo review in CIA
cases poses dangers because judges have "little or no background in the
149
delicate business of intelligence gathering"
directly conflicts with the
legislative history of the 1974 FOIA amendments, which revised Exemption I.
The need for de novo judicial review in national security matters was expressed
forcefully by Representative John Moss of California, widely recognized as the
driving force behind the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 and a principal
150
crafter of the statute's 1974 amendments.
Moss argued that judges have the
15
capacity to review even sensitive matters of national security. "I do not think

143. H.R. REP. No. 98-726, at 4.
144. !d. at 9.

145. See Pub. L. No. 98-477,98 Stat. 2209-2212 (1984).
146. 50 U.S.C. § 431,98 Stat. 2209,2209-2210.
147. 50 U.S.C. § 431,98 Stat. 2210.
148. !d.
149. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S 159, 176 (1985).
150. From 1955 until the FOIA was enacted in 1966, Rep. Moss chaired two
committees that steered the legislation for the FOIA. The Moss committees, as they were
called, held 173 hearings and published 17 volumes of transcripts and 14 volumes of reports.
JOHN T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 6-9 (3d ed. 2000). O'Reilly's book
is the leading legal practice guide on The Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act.
151. See House and Senate Debate on Freedom of Information Act Amendments of
1974, House Debate and Vote, Mar. 14, 1974 (Statement by Rep. John Moss), reprinted in
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we have to make dummies out of [judges] by insisting they accept without
question an affidavit from some bureaucrat-anxious to protect his decisions
whether they be good or bad-that a particular document was properly
classified and should remain secret," Moss said during the House debate on the
1974 FOIA amendments. "No bureaucrat is going to admit he might have made
152
a mistake." Moss said it was the intent of Congress in 1966, and again in
1974, to make it "crystal clear" that the courts must be "free to employ
whatever means they find necessary to discharge their responsibilities" through
. de novo revtew
. wtt
. h respect to c Iasst"fite d.mfiormation.
· 153
compreh enstve
B. The Marshall-Brennan Concurrence
In a strongly worded concurring opinion by Justice Thurgood Marshall that
was joined by Justice William J. Brennan, Marshall disagreed with the majority
on two important issues. First, he argued that the Court majority's broad
definition of "intelligence sources" exceeded the plain meaning and legislative
history of "any congressional act," and that it conflicted directly with the
154
FOIA's broad mandate for disclosure.
Second, he asserted that the Court
majority should have ordered the CIA to justify withholding under Exemption
155
1 and not under Exemption 3.
Marshall said he agreed with the outcome of the majority opinion; the
definition of "intelligence sources" crafted by the D.C. Circuit Court was too
narrow and would release more material than should be disclosed in the Sims
156
case.
He argued, however, that the Sims Court majority went to the other
157
He rejected the majority
extreme, crafting a "sweeping alternative."
definition of "intelligence source," contending that its overly broad
construction improperly equates "intelligence source" with the nearly limitless
158
term, "information source."
Under the majority definition, he argued, even
newspapers, road maps and telephone directories would fall under the Court's
definition of"intelligence sources," thereby casting an irrebuttable presumption
of secrecy over an "expansive array of information" held by the CIA, including
. fiormatton
. that ts
. o f no mte
. 11·tgence vaIue. 159
m
.
According to Marshall, the term "intelligence source" does not have a
single and readily-apparent definition compelled by the plain language of §

THE 1974 FOIA GUIDE, supra note 32, at 257.
152. !d.
!53. !d. at 258.
154. Sims, 471 U.S. at 182 (Marshall, J., concurring).
!55. !d. at 189-90.
156. !d. at 181-82, 194.
157. !d. at 182.
158. !d. at 187.
159. !d. at 191.
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160

102(d)(3), as the majority justices concluded.
He argued that the legislative
history of the National Security Act suggests a congressional intent to protect
only those individuals who might be harmed or silenced if they were
161
identified.
"The heart of the issue is whether the term 'intelligence source'
connotes that which is confidential or clandestine, and the answer is far from
162
obvious," Marshall asserted.
He offered a compromise definition, which he
said reflects the statutory language and legislative history of the National
Security Act, while also falling within the congressionally-imposed limits on
163
the CIA's exercise of discretion.
He interpreted "intelligence sources" to
refer only to sources who provide information on either an expressed or implied
164
promise of confidentiality.
Marshall defended his definition, arguing that it
would meet the CIA's concerns about confidentiality because it would protect
not only "intelligence sources" but also protect the kind of information that
16
would lead to identifying such a source.
Marshall reserved his harshest criticism for the CIA's "litigation strategy,"
which used ExemRtion 3 instead of Exemption 1 to withhold the requested
66
Marshall contended that by invoking Exemption 3 to
MKULTRA data.
withhold the information, the CIA "cleverly evaded" judicial de novo
167
review -a crucial check created by Congress specifically to limit federal
168
Marshall pointed out that Exemption 1
agency discretion under the FOIA.
would have allowed for the same outcome-the withholding of the researchers'
169
identities-while at the same time preserving limits on Agency discretion.
Exemption 1 provides two important checks on a federal agency's
discretion to withhold a record. The first restriction is procedural, in that an
agency is not the judge of what can be classified; this determination is made by
170
each presidential administration under an executive order.
Second, the
171
Under the
judiciary has an important checking role through de novo review.
power of judicial review in Exemption 1 cases, the courts have the authority to
confirm that records asserted to be classified were indeed classified according

160. Id. at 187.
161. !d.
162. Id. at 186.
163. !d.
164. !d.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 184 n.3.
167. Id. at 190.
168. 5 u.s.c. § 552 (2005).
169. Marshall noted that under President Ronald Reagan's executive order on
classification, in effect at the time, "the Agency need make but a limited showing to a court
to invoke Exemption 1 for that material." Sims, 471 U.S. at 190 n.6 (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (citing Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983)).
170. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A).
171. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
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172

to guidelines established by an executive order.
Marshall argued that the Court should have directed the CIA to withhold
the MKUL TRA materials under Exemption 1, the national security
173
exemption.
He said Exemption 1 properly cloaks "classes of information that
warrant protection, as long as the government proceeds through a publicly174
issued, congressionally-scrutinized and judicially-enforced order."
He
characterized the national security exemption as the keystone of a
congressional system that balances deference to the executive branch's interest
in maintaining secrecy with continued oversight by the judicial and
175
congressional branches of government:
"Congress, it is clear, sought to
assure that the government would not operate behind a veil of secrecx, and it
176
narrowly tailored the exceptions to the fundamental goal of disclosure."
In permitting the CIA to avoid de novo review, Marshall said the Sims
majority enabled the CIA to sidestep re¥,uirements carefully crafted by
1
As a result, the CIA has been
Congress to limit the Agency's discretion.
exempt for the last two decades from releasing virtually any information that
the CIA Director merely contends may qualify as, or compromise, a source of
178
intelligence. Under the sweeping Sims standard, the CIA:
(1) Need not go through a classification process to withhold
179
information.
(2) Can withhold unclassified information, regardless of how dated or
mnocuous 1t may be. 180
(3) Need not assert that a disclosure conceivably could affect national
security, nor even argue that it could reasonably be expected to cause
0

0

172. !d. "[T]he court shall determine the matter de novo and may examine the contents
of such agency records in camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall
be withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section." See also
H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, at 12 (1974); S. REP. No. 93-1200, at 12 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6290.
173. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b )(I). When the case was first heard by the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia, the court held that the names of institutions and researchers could
not be withheld because they were not "intelligence sources" within the meaning of Section
102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947. Sims, 479 F. Supp. at 87. However, District
Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer, who wrote the opinion, said that the names of the researchers
could be classified for national security reasons under Exemption 1 to withhold their
identities. Id. at 88. Oberdorfer indicated his willingness to reconsider the CIA's decision to
withhold the MKUL TRA information if the Agency refiled and claimed Exemption 1
protection. Id. at 88. However, the CIA stuck with its Exemption 3 litigation strategy
throughout the proceedings.
174. Sims, 471 U.S. at 183 (Marshall, J., concurring).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 182, citing S. REP. No. 89-813, at 10 (1965).
177. Jd.at189.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 183-84, 190.
180. Id. at 178 (majority opinion).

2006]

OF SECRETS AND SPIES

375

181

identifiable damage.
(4) Is not required to show that an "intelligence source" had requested
. l"tty. 182
fid
con 1 entta
However the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
1 3
Act of 2004 8 has seriously cast doubt on the viability of Sims. Because the
184
new law amended the National Security Act of 1947,
any questions
pertaining to access to CIA-held information under the FOIA must now be
construed in light of the 2004 statute, which is examined in the next Part.
III. INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT NEGATES SIMS HOLDING

After years of government hearings and official reports on September 11th,
Congress enacted the massive 234-page Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
185
Prevention Act of 2004.
Among other provisions, the act completely
186
overhauled the leadership of the United States intelligence apparatus,
largely
187
by amending the National Security Act of 1947. The "sources and methods"
language that was construed in Sims appeared in Section 102(d)(3) of the
188
which established the CIA and the Director
original National Security Act,
of Central Intelligence, who headed both the Agency and, at least nominally,
the entire intelligence community. This section provided, in pertinent part, that
"the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for R{otecting
9
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure .... "
A. Statutory Construction

That entire section was stricken by Section 1011 of the Intelligence Reform
Act, which is subtitled "Reorganization and Improvement of Management of
190
Intelligence Community."
The new section completely rewrites Sections
102-104 of the National Security Act to create a new Director of National
Intelligence (DNI), who, significantly, does not head the CIA, but rather stands
above it as "head of the intelligence community" and "principal adviser to the
President, to the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security

181. /d. at 190 (Marshall, J., concurring).
182. /d.
183. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
118 Stat. 3638-3872.
184. National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343,61 Stat. 495-510.
185. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of2004.
186. /d. at§§ 1001-1103.
187. National Security Act of 1947.
188. /d. at§ 102(d)(3).
189. !d.
190. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 § 1011 (codified at 50
u.s.c. § 403 (2005)).
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191

Council" on intelligence matters.
In language almost identical to the old Section 102(d)(3 ), the new Section
102A(i)(l) charges the new DNI to "protect intelligence sources and methods
192
from unauthorized disclosure."
The similarity in language might appear to
support merely transferring the statutory construction in Sims to any new case
that might arise: the Supreme Court has certainly held Congress to the Court's
previous construction of a word or phrase when Congress uses the same word
193
or phrase m a new statute.
However, several factors grounded in text, context, and public policy
militate against following that canon in this case. Above all, Congress itself had
explicitly declined to endorse the Sims interpretation of that language more
194
than a decade earlier.
In their report accompanying the Intelligence
195
House and Senate conferees
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993,
declined to take any position "with respect to the interpretation of similar
196
language in existing law in CIA v. Sims . ... "
0

Whether there is justification to permit the DCI to withhold information
concerning intelligence sources and methods which is not classified, in response to
requests made under the FOIA is a matter that deserves closer, more systematic
review by the committees of jurisdiction prior to taking further legislative action.
The conferees believe that this conference report, which addresses organizational
structure, is not the appropriate vehicle to address this issue. Thus, in enacting
subsection 103(c)(5) as contained in section 705, the conferees do not intend their
action to constitute an endorsement of the holding in Sims. 197

The Supreme Court has held that legislative history explicitly rejecting a
prior statutory construction of reenacted legislative language is sufficient to put
198
that construction to rest.
Surely, legislative history refusing to endorse a

191. 50 U.S.C. § 403(b)(l)-(3) (2005). Indeed, the new DNI is precluded from serving
as what is now called "the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency."§ 403(c).
192. 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(l) (2005).
193. See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1917) ("This
definition of an immoral purpose was given [by the Court] prior to the enactment of the act
now under consideration, and must be presumed to have been known to Congress when it
enacted the law here involved.").
194. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 102-963, at 88 (1992), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2605,2614.
195. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. I 02-496, 106
Stat. 3180 (1993).
196. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 102-963, at 88
197. !d.
198. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.S. 499, 503 (1962). This case concerned
the 1939 enactment of the tax code, under which meals and lodging in connection with
medical treatment had been construed by the court as deductible expenses. When Congress
reenacted the code in 1954, including the language regarding medical deductions, the House
and Senate committee reports explicitly rejected the meals and lodging deduction. When the
court faced the issue again in 1962, it held that the legislative history of the new act trumped
the court's construction of the old one.
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prior statutory construction would defeat any argument that Congress
acquiesced to that construction.
Although the review suggested by the conferees never took place, both the
text and legislative history of the new act indicate that Congress created the
new position ofDNI, not because sensitive information was released too freely,
199
As then-Senator Bob Graham
but because it was not released freely enough.
(D-Fla.), former Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee and a conferee
on the new legislation, remarked during debate on the conference report, "Our
intelligence community has developed an unhealthy obsession with secrecy ...
200
[which] poses a serious and continuing threat to our national security."
This legislation addresses this problem by directing that more rational guidelines
for intelligence classification be established, and that an independent board be
empowered to review these decisions. This is an important first step toward
abandoning this dangerous obsession, and making sure that secrecy decisions are
made for reasons of national security, rather than because agencies are trying to
bury their mistakes. 201

Textually, both old and new statutes discuss the dissemination of
intelligence information within the sections prescribing protection for sources
and methods. But whereas the old statute merely charges the CIA with
202
"appropriate dissemination" of intelligence within the govemment,
the new
statute expressly imposes a check on discretion to withhold information by
requiring the DNI to "maximize the dissemination of intelligence" b~
establishing and implementing "guidelines" for the intelligence community?
Furthermore, these guidelines are to cover not only "classification of
204
information," but also "access to and dissemination ofintelligence."
Most importantly, the guidelines make more information available by
providing for the "[p]reparation of intelligence products in such a way that
source information is removed to allow for dissemination at the lowest level of
205
classification possible or in unclassified form to the extent practicable."
Although this provision primarily governs dissemination within the
government, it is plainly incompatible with the unfettered, case-by-case
discretion that the Sims Court granted the DCI to determine what information
might, however indirectly, compromise intelligence sources. If the guidelines
comply with the mandate of Congress, and the agencies comply with the
guidelines, unclassified records will necessarily protect those sources.
Apart from intelligence sources and methods, the operational files of the
CIA generally constitute the most sensitive records within the Agency. Here,
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

See infra notes 228-70 and accompanying text.
150 CONG. REc. Sll939-0l (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2004).
/d.

National Security Act of 1947 § l02(d)(3).
50 U.S.C. § 403-l(i)(2) (2005).
50 U.S.C. § 403-l(i)(2)(A)-(B).
50 u.s. c. § 403-l (i)(2)(C).
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too, the new act limits the Agency's discretion to withhold those records from
public scrutiny. Under the old National Security Act, as amended by the
206
the DCI was
Central Intelligence Agency Information Act in 1984,
authorized to exempt his own agency's operational files from disclosure under
207
the Freedom of Information Act.
The new act now requires the
"coordination of the Director of National Intelligence" before the Director of
208
the CIA may exempt operational files.
Few would doubt that most such
209
operational files will continue to be exempted,
but the imposition of a
second, higher, and more detached approving authority must certainly be read
as enhancing the possibility of disclosure where appropriate. At the very least,
it checks the natural tendency of the CIA to issue blanket exemptions for all
operational records.
Only one additional paragraph in the original National Security Act of
1947 pertains to the dissemination of intelligence, and it essentially gave the
DCI access to national security intelligence held by other government
departments and a§encies, including, upon written request, the Federal Bureau
21
of Investigation.
The new version, by contrast, contains several independent
provisions that reinforce the legislative intent that intelligence information be
shared more freely within the government and even with the private sector.
Although only one of these specifically concerns the Freedom of Information
211
the combination strongly suggests that a new frame of reference is
Act,
required of any court considering intelligence-related FOIA requests.
For example, one provision subtitled "Intelligence Information Sharing"
requires the DNI to "ensure maximum availability of and access to intelligence
information within the intelligence community consistent with national security
212
That provision charges the DNI to "establish policies and
requirements."
procedures to resolve conflicts between the need to share intelligence and the
213
need to protect intelligence sources and methods." Another provision of the
new act, similarly subtitled "Information Sharing," requires the President to
create an "Information Sharing Environment" and renames the Information

206. CIA Information Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-477,98 Stat. 2209 (1984).
207. Freedom oflnformation Act§ 701(a).
208. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
§ 1071(a)(6), 118 Stat. 3638-3872.
209. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 does, however,
establish a comprehensive regime for judicial review of exemption decisions, § 431 (f), and
decennial review of all exempted files with a view toward removing the exemptions, §
43l(g). These provisions are carried over from the CIA Information Act of 1984. See supra
notes 140-4 7 and accompanying text.
210. National Security Act of 1947 § 102(e), Ch. 343, 61 Stat. 495-510. Similar, but
more generous access is provided the DNI at 50 U.S.C. § 403-l(b).
211. National Security Act of 1947 § 485(b)(2)(A).
212. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 § IOII(g) (codified at
50 u.s.c. § 403-l(g)(l) (2005)).
213. /d.
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Systems Council established b~ rresidential order
in August 2004 as the
1
"Information Sharing Council."
Although this provision specifically relates
to terrorism information, rather than intelligence information generally, it
reinforces the new policy paradigm by mandating an environment that "allows
users to share information among agencies, between levels of government, and,
.
. h the pnvate
.
as appropnate,
w1t
sector. ,216
In addition to information sharing, the new act contains several provisions
designed to protect civil rights and civil liberties, with respect to both
intelligence and law enforcement functions. These provisions represent a
further restraint on the agency's proclivity toward secrecy. The Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, for example, must include a Civil Liberties
Protection Officer to "ensure that protection of civil liberties and privacy is
appropriately incorporated in the policies and procedures developed for and
217
implemented by" the intelligence community. Moreover, a Privacy and Civil
Liberties Overs~ht Board must be established within the Executive Office of
21
219
the President.
Congress explicitly made the board subject to FOIA.
The
act further declares that "[it] is the sense of Congress that each executive
department or agency with law enforcement or antiterrorism functions should
220
designate a privacy and civil liberties officer."
The recognition of the
protections for civil rights and civil liberties is significant to the extent that
"civil liberties" encompasses the public's right to know what its government is
doing.
The new act also extends the Public Interest Declassification Board for
221
another four years, through 2008.
The Board was authorized in 2000 to
"promote the fullest possible public access to a thorough, accurate, and reliable
documentary record of significant United States national security decisions and
... activities ... "by recommending "the identification, collection, and review
for declassification of information of extraordinary public interest that does not
222
The Board's
undermine the national security of the United States .... "
powers also are enhanced, particularly with respect to congressional requests
214

214. Exec. Order No. 13,356, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,599 (Aug. 27, 2004) (entitled
"Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect Americans").
215. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 § 1016 (codified at 6
u.s.c. § 485 (2005)).
216. 6 U.S.C. § 485(b)(2)(A) (2005).
217. 50 u.s.c. § 403-3d(b)(l) (2005).
218. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of.2004 § 1061(b) (For more
information see the notes contained in 5 U.S.C. § 601).
219. !d. § 1061(i)(2).
220. !d. § 1062. The Department of Homeland Security also receives an Officer for
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties under the Act§ 8303 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 345 (2005)).
221. !d.§ 1102 (t).
222. Pub. Interest Declassification Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-567, § 703(b)(2)-(3), 114
Stat. 2856 (2000) (see 50 U.S.C. § 435 note).
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. fiormation.
. 223
fior m
Finally, one cannot leave the text of the Intelligence Reform Act without
noting the paean to freedom of the press embodied in the act's section on
224
"Promotion of Free Media and Other American Values."
Declaring that
"[f]reedom of speech and freedom of the press are fundamental human
225
rights," the act establishes as the policy of the United States the "~romotion
22
of freedom of the press and freedom of media worldwide .... "
A cynic
might look upon this provision as little more than a mechanism for American
propaganda, but one could be forgiven for thinking that Congress actually
meant what it said-that these sentiments apply with equal or greater force
within the United States. Significantly, this provision appears in Title VII of the
227
act, titled "9/11 Commission Implementation Act." The recommendations of
that Commission, along with Congress's Joint Panel Report, anchor the new
act's legislative history, which further supports the assertion that Sims is no
longer controlling precedent.

B. The 9/11 Investigations
228

and the Senate and House Joint Panel
The 9/11 Commission Report
229
Report
form the essential factual predicate for the Intelligence Reform
230
Act.
Both of these investigations were harshly critical of the nation's
intelligence community and found that the terrorist attacks might have been
thwarted if the spy agencies had done a better job of sharing and publicizing
some significant information they possessed about the activities of known and
231
suspected al-Qaeda members.
1. The CIA's failed leadership role

Both reports frequently singled out the CIA in particular for concealing
information from the public that revealed a string of operational failures and
223. !d. § 703 (b)(5).
224. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, § 106l(b), § 7108
(see 22 U.S.C. § 1431 note).
225. !d. § 71 08(b )(I )(A).
226. !d. § 71 08(b )(2)(A).
227. !d. § 7001.
228. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2.
229. SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMM. REPORT, supra note 3.
230. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
118 Stat. 3638-3872.
231. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 353, 355-56, 400-03; SENATE AND
HousE SELECT COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at xvii. See also David Johnston, Report of
9/11 Panel Cites Lapses by C.I.A. and F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2003, at AI, A13; See
Dana Priest, Hill's 9/IJ Probe Finds Multiple Failures; White House, CIA Kept Key
Portions ofReport Classified, WASH. POST, July 25,2003, at AI, A16.
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missteps in the weeks and months before the attacks on New York City and
Washington, D.C. In examining the roles and responsibilities of the nation's
respective intelligence agencies, The 9111 Commission Report said that
"[b]efore 9/11 the CIA was plainly the lead agency confronting al-Qaeda," and
232
the Agency had gathered vital information about potential acts of terrorism.
For example, Commission investigators found that for nearly two years before
the attacks, the CIA had been aware of the terrorist ties of two 9/11 hijackers
33
who were living in Southern California.Z The Agency had received reports of
terrorist threats within the United States but did not consider issuing a public
234
The 9/11 Commission Report also revealed that the CIA had received a
alert.
briefing ~aper entitled "Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly" just weeks before the
5
attacks? The briefing told of the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui, who was
taken into custody in Minnesota in mid-August 2001 after his behavior in a
flight school aroused the suspicions of his flight instructor who contacted local
236
authorities. The CIA failed to investigate that information further.
However, as early as December 1998, four months after Usama bin Laden
ordered the bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa, former CIA
Director George J. Tenet issued a memo to several top intelligence officials
237
declaring war on the bin Laden terror network.
"We are at war," Tenet
238
The CIA shared
wrote. "I want no resources or people spared in this effort. "
some information with a small circle of senior government officials, but the
imminent dangers £erceived by the Agency and its declaration of war were
39
In other words, the 9/11 Commission concluded, the CIA
never made public.
fought this "war" in secret and without the aid of perhaps the nation's most
powerful weapon-an alerted American ~ublic, fully informed about the grave
40
threats posed by bin Laden and al-Qaeda.
The 2003 Joint Panel Report, which was issued a year before The 9/11
Commission Report, concluded that the CIA-led intelligence community
possessed enough solid information before the attacks to prompt a "heightened
sense of alert" and recommend defensive measures such as strengthening
aviation security, placing suspected terrorists here and abroad on watch lists,

232. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 400.
233. See id. at 215-21; SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at

143-52.
234. See 9/11COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2; at 353-58; SENATE AND HOUSE
SELECT COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at 118. See also Priest, supra note 233; Johnston,
supra note 7.
235. 9/11COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 347.
236. !d. at 347.
237. Tenet resigned June 3, 2004 and left his post on July 11, 2004. He was succeeded
by Porter Goss, a former U.S. Representative from Florida.
238. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 357.
239. !d. at 357.
240. See id. at 103.
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coordinating investigation and law enforcement efforts with local and state
authorities, and alertin¥, the American public to the seriousness and immediacy
41
of the potential threat.
In strongly worded language, the Joint Panel Report
noted that the excessive secrecy practiced by the CIA, along with other
intelligence services, resulted in "missed opportunities" that would have
"greatly enhanced" the chances of exposing Usama bin Laden's terrorist
.
242
consptracy.
One of the overarching themes that ran consistently and repeatedly
throughout the 9/11 Commission and Joint Panel reports was that for decades
the CIA had been able to avoid accountability, not only to Congress, but also to
the public. The intelligence committees that reported to the Senate and House
Joint Panel inquiry recommended, for example, that:
The president should review and consider amendments to the executive orders,
policies and procedures that govern the national security classification of
intelligence information, in an effort to expand access to relevant information for
federal agencies outside the intelligence community, for state and local authorities,
which are critical to the fight against terrorism, and for the American public. 243

The Joint Panel Report made clear its view that an informed public should
be a goal of an effective information dissemination policy: "[t]he record of this
Joint Inquiry indicates that, prior to September 11, 2001, the U.S. Intelligence
Community was involved in fighting a 'war' against Bin Laden largely without
the benefit of what some would call its most potent weapon in that effort: an
244
alert and committed American public."
Similarly, the 9111 Commission Report emphasized repeatedly that greater
oversight and accountability of the nation's intelligence processes are vital to
help avert future terrorist assaults on American soil. Among the references to
241. SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at XV, 118.
242. fd. at XV.
243. Excerpts From Report on Intelligence Actions and the Sept. 11 Attacks, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2003, at A12, Al3. In its analysis of the report by congressional intelligence
committees, the New York Times found repeated calls for increased accountability and
oversight of the nation's spy agencies, especially the CIA. Included among the intelligence
committees' findings are the following recommendations: "Recognizing the importance of
intelligence in this nation's struggle against terrorism, Congress should maintain vigorous,
informed and constructive oversight of the intelligence community"; "[T]he National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States should study and make
recommendations concerning how Congress may improve its oversight of the intelligence
community"; Such recommendations should consider "the extent to which classification
decisions impair congressional oversight"; "Assured standards of accountability are critical
to developing the personal responsibility, urgency and diligence which our counterterrorism
responsibility requires"; "[T]he director of central intelligence and the heads of intelligence
community agencies should require that measures designed to ensure accountability are
implemented throughout the community"; "[A]s part of the confirmation process for
intelligence community officials, Congress should require from these officials an affirmative
commitment to the implementation of strong accountability mechanisms throughout the
intelligence community."
244. SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at 124.
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the importance of accountability and oversight of intelligence operations, the
report noted:
I. "Congress needs dramatic change ... to strengthen oversight and focus
accountab1"l"tty. ,245
2. "[T]he oversight function of Congress has diminished over time .... The
unglamorous but essential work of [intelligence operations] oversight has been
neglected, and few members (of Congress) past or present believe it is
246
performed well."
3. "Of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight
247
may be among the most difficult and important."
4. "Congressional oversight for intelligence-and counterterrorism-is
248
now dysfunctional."
The 9/11 Commission Report, like the Joint Panel Report, also underscored
the crucial role that an informed public must play, in connection with effective
congressional oversight, to hold the CIA and the intelligence community at
large accountable: "[T]he Intelligence committees [that operate under CIA
secrecy constraints] cannot take advantage of democracy's best oversight
mechanism: public disclosure. This makes them significantly different from
other congressional oversight committees, which are often spurred into action
249
by the work of investigative journalists and watchdog organizations."
The importance of CIA accountability to the public was also expressed in
the testimony of several key witnesses before the 9/11 Commission. In his
testimony before the Commission, Arizona Republican Senator John McCain
echoed the Joint Panel Report's finding that more access to CIA information
should be granted not only to Commission and congressional investigators, but
also to the general public:
I support the fullest possible public disclosure of all commission hearings and
findings consistent with existing law and the national security precautions written
into the enacting legislation. I encourage you to hold public hearings as frequently
as possible and to publicly issue substantive, interim reports on the Commission's
progress as envisioned and allowed in the enacted legislation. 250

The need to have an informed American public actively engaged in the
discourse about national security was also articulated by former Clinton
Administration Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen in his testimony to the
9/11 Commission. In considering the various courses of action that could be

9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at xvi.
!d. at 105.
!d. at 419.
!d. at 420.
!d. at 103.
John McCain, Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the U.S. (May 22, 2003) (available at LexisNexis Congressional Universe, 4 CIS J 89255, at
3).
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
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taken to avert another attack, Cohen testified that it was important to:
[d]evelop meaningful, in-depth public discussion-among our citizens and not just
our elected officials-regarding what compromises on privacy we are willing to
accept in order to remain safe and free .... We must elevate public discussion on
these matters, and do our best to remove them from electoral manipulation at least
until we truly understand the issues and choices. 251

2. The Call for a New Intelligence-Information Paradigm
The legislative history of the Intelligence Reform Act contains
considerable evidence to support the notion that a new paradigm must be
developed for intelligence information dissemination-a modern 21st century
model that reflects open government and public accountability.
Indeed, the protracted political wrangling between the Administration and
9/11 Commission focused nearly entirely on access to information that the
White House resisted disclosing. The White House had a strained relationship
with the 9/11 Commission and its chair, former New Jersey Republican
Governor Thomas H. Kean, ever since Congress created the Commission over
252
Virtually all of the disputes centered around
Bush Administration objections.
access to CIA-held information. This conflict was not new. In the Joint Panel
Report released before the 9111 Commission was formed, congressional
253
For
investigators sharply criticized the CIA for "information hoarding."
example, the Administration, on the recommendation of the CIA, redacted 28
pages from the nearly 900-page Joint Panel Report. The New York Times later
reported that the 28 pages focused mainly on Saudi Arabia, the home nation for
54
15 of the 19 hijackers, according to people who saw the section? Sources
familiar with the redacted material said the passages were a "searing
indictment" of how Saudi Arabia's rulers used Islamic charities and other
255
organizations as a conduit to distribute millions of dollars to terrorists.
The
newspaper said the redactions aroused resentment in Congress, where some
lawmakers accused the Administration of concealing crucial facts about the
56
attacks? "I've reviewed the 28 pages twice, and my judgment is that 90 to 95
percent could be released and not compromise our intelligence in any way,"

251. William S. Cohen, Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the U.S. (Mar. 23, 2004) (available at LexisNexis Congressional Universe, 4 CIS J
892137, at 24).
252. Philip Shenon, Bush Agrees to Answer All Of 9/11 Panel's Questions, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2004, at Al4.
253. SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at 7.
254. David Johnston, Classified Section of Sept. 11 Report Faults Saudi Rulers, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 2003, at Al.
255. !d.
256. !d.
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said Alabama Republican Senator Richard C. Shelby.
Eventually, after several confrontations between the White House and
Kean, most of the contested information was made available to the 9/11
258
Commission.
In his testimony before the 9/11 Commission, McCain
deplored the Administration's information-withholding practices for "creating
59
the appearance of bureaucratic stonewalling.',2
For example, McCain
criticized the Administration for withholding from the 9/11 Commission some
information that had previously been gathered by the intelligence committees
that reported to the Senate and House Joint Panel. McCain recounted one
incident in which U.S. Representative Tim Roemer, who had served on the
Joint Panel investigation, was later denied access to material contained in the
Joint Panel Report after Roemer, an Indiana Democrat, was appointed to the
9/11 Commission. Eventually, the Administration complied with Roemer's
request. "I find it particularly troubling," McCain testified, "that Commission
member and former Congressman Tim Roemer, who helped write the
congressional report as a member of the House Intelligence Committee, was
260
until this month denied access to his committee's own product."
The findings of the Congressional Joint Panel Report and the 9/11
Commission Report, combined with the history of the troubled relationship
between 9/11 investigators on the one side and the Administration and CIA on
the other side, reveal the true nature of the core struggle: Who is to control
government-held information on issues of vital public concern, including
questions of national defense? The fact that this struggle is even taking place
reflects the emergence of a growing movement to effect change and to move
away from the kind of outdated model evinced in The National Security Act of
261
262
1947
and the Supreme Court's rationale in CIA v. Sims.
The developing
model seems to be one that is firmly grounded in the accountability principles
of democracy in an open society--even when it comes to intelligence matters.
According to the Joint Panel Report, the intelligence community must
"overcome bureaucratic information-hoarding" and "take decisive steps to
reexamine the fundamental intellectual assumptions that have guided the IC's
[Intelligence Community's] approach to managing national security
263
information."
Specifically, the report noted that it may become necessary to
"create a new paradigm wherein 'ownership of information,' did not belong to

257.
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259.
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260.
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Editorial, Credible Classifications, WASH. POST, July 13,2004, at Al4.
Shenon, supra note 252.
John McCain, Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
Second Public Hearing (May 22, 2003) (available at LexisNexis Congressional
4 CIS J 89255, at 2).
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Pub: L. No. 80-253, § 102(d)(3) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (2005)).
Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985).
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264

the collectors."
This idea of creating a new paradigm for intelligence
information dissemination is reiterated throughout the Joint Panel's analysis:
[l]t becomes clear that the sort of sophisticated pattern-analysis and semi- or fullyautomated "data-mining" capabilities that will be necessary for intelligence
analysis to keep up with complex transnational threats such as those presented by
Usama bin Laden's Al-Qa'ida organization are not compatible with traditional
notions of inter-Intelligence Community secrecy and restrictions upon access
based upon an outsider's "need to know" as determined by the agency
information-holders themselves. 265

This emerging belief that current intelligence information-dissemination
systems are outmoded and no longer effective was also expressed by former
Clinton Administration Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright in her 9/11
266
Commission testimony.
Albright said that the practices of excessive secrecy
and habitual withholding of government-held intelligence-related information
were routine and even appropriate during the Cold War when the government
cloaked all of its intelligence information:
except from those with a very specific need to know .... The dissemination of
information was controlled by the originating agency. And clear separations were
maintained between public and private, domestic and international, law
enforcement and intelligence .... The old system was appropriate for the times but
the times have changed. 267

Finally, the matter of CIA mistakes and misjudgments in connection with
the 2003 invasion of Iraq bears mentioning in this analysis because these lapses
also demonstrate how excessive secrecy has undermined Agency effectiveness
and good management. In a unanimous report released in July 2004, the Senate
Intelligence Committee concluded after its investigation that CIA assessments
of Iraqi weapons strength-particularly chemical, biological and nuclear
268
weapons of mass destruction-were overstated or unfounded.
The 511-page
report described the Agency as a broken and dysfunctional corporate culture
269
"In the end, what the President and the
suffering from poor management:
Congress used to send the country to war was information provided by the
270
intelligence community, and that information was flawed."

264. Id. at 7.
265. Id. at 33.
266. Madeleine K. Albright, Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the U.S. (Mar. 23, 2004) (available at LexisNexis Congressional Universe, 4
CIS J 892134, at 21 ).
267. Id.
268. See PREWAR INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 23. See also Douglas Jehl,
Senators Assail C.I.A. Judgments on Iraq's Arms as Deeply Flawed, N.Y. TiMES, July 10,
2004, at AI; Dana Priest, supra note 231, at AI.
269. See PREWAR INTELLIGENCE REPORT, supra note 23.
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2006]

OF SECRETS AND SPIES

387

CONCLUSION

The government's need to protect confidential sources is an inherent aspect
of effective intelligence operations. However, the Court majority in CIA v.
. 271 equates the term ""mte 11"1gence sources " w1t
. h any source o f
S1ms
272
information,
thus creating an irrebuttable presumption of secrecy over a vast
array of CIA-held materials, including information that is of questionable
. 11"1gence va1ue. 273
mte
274
In so ruling, as Justice Marshall pointed out,
the Court contravened the
275
plain text and legislative intent of the FOIA.
As this Article has shown, the
Sims majority discounted the FOIA's extensive legislative history, including
276
the seminal 1965 Senate report that accompanied the originallegislation, and
278
277
the 1974
and 1976
amendments, which reflected Congress's intent to
require as much disclosure as possible, even in matters of national securif1c.
2
Additionally, the Court's selective reading of the 1984 CIA Information Act 9
is an exercise in historical revisionism; the Court majority completely ignored
key provisions in the Act that made clear that the FOIA's disclosure rules apply
to all materials that fall outside the narrowly defined category of "operational
280
files."
In effect, the Supreme Court replaced Congress's policy judgments
with those of the Sims majority.
As a result, the CIA has been able to shroud itself in secrecy and insulate
itself from the twin spurs of public criticism and public accountability,
undermining not only Agency effectiveness but also the public's trust in
government. CIA failures surrounding the 2001 terrorist attacks and the 2003
invasion of Iraq illustrate that the deference to secrecy that the Court read into
281
the National Security Act of 1947
is no longer warranted, if it ever was, as
congressional lawmakers strongly suggested when they refused to endorse the
282
Sims decision in the 1993 Intelligence Authorization Act.
The old paradigm-which is grounded in the belief that carte blanche
secrecy in matters of intelligence and national security automatically outweighs
the public benefits of disclosure--does not reflect the culture of post-Cold War
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and post-9/11 Arnerica.
Echoing former Secretary of State Albright, who
called for reforming intelligence information policy, the nonpartisan 9/ll
Commission concluded: "[T]he national security institutions of the U.S.
government are still the institutions constructed to win the Cold War. The
284
United States confronts a very different world today."
The 9/11 Commission Report recommended that Congess devise a fresh
2
The Intelligence
model of governmental management in this new era.
286
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,
which adopted many of the
9/11 Commission's findings, recognizes how unchecked secrecy can conceal
serious problems in Agency management and also understands that an informed
public must perform an important function in any system created to ensure
87
effective congressional oversight of the intelligence services.Z
Specific
features of the Act-its provisions for the broadest possible dissemination of
. 11·1gence m1ormat1on
. .c
. 288 an d 10r
.c enh ance d dec Iass1.fi1cat1on
. proce dures, 289 1ts
.
mte
290
respect for civil rights and civil liberties,
and even its promotion of press
291
freedom -Ieave little doubt that the information-dissemination policy
paradigm has changed and Sims is no longer a viable statutory construction
292
under the FOIA.
With Sims removed as an obstacle to disclosure, it is now possible to revisit
what Congress actually intended for the courts to do when it comes to handling
FOIA requests for CIA-held information. We propose a two-~art approach.
93
First, the CIA should no longer be allowed to use Exemption 3
to sidestep
Exemption 1's provisions requiring de novo judicial review of classified
information and mandating the segregation and release of unclassified material
. d m
. a cIass1.fi1ed document. 294 The natlona
. I secunty
.
·
contame
exemptiOn
represents a carefully crafted check on Agency discretion that balances
deference to intelligence secrecy concerns with judicial oversight. Second,
when the question of defining an "intelligence source" arises, as it certainly
will, the courts should adopt a definition that provides a nondiscretionary test to
clarify whether a source of information is an "intelligence source" and
deserving of confidentiality. For such a definition, the test crafted by Justice
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Marshall still has merit today. Under this standard, confidentiality would
extend to "intelligence sources" who provide information on either an explicit
or implicit promise of confidentiality, or who would be harmed or silenced if
identified. Further, confidentiality also would be extended to information that
could reasonably be expected to lead to the identification of an intelligence
295
source.
We understand that if the courts were to adopt this approach, obstacles to
access would still persist. Classification criteria are determined by the
President, and these standards vary with each administration. Also, the
executive branch agencies historically have overused the "classified" stamp,
296 H
.
.
creatmg
vast storerooms o f " secret" documents.
owever, t he senous
problem of overclassification, which must be resolved as well, is a distinctly
separate issue and beyond the scope of this Article.
This Article's proposal for court treatment of CIA nondisclosure decisions
offers a significant step toward protecting legitimate "intelligence sources"
while also providing for more government transparency and greater access to
the kind of intelligence information necessary for meaningful public discourse
on the vital policy questions facing this nation.

295. Sims, 471 U.S. at 193-94 (Marshall, J., concurring).
296. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("[W]hen everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system
becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated by those
intent on self-protection or self-promotion. I should suppose, in short, that the hallmark of a
truly effective internal security system would be the maximum possible disclosure,
recognizing that secrecy can best be preserved only when credibility is truly maintained.")
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